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Different theories of decision making on the U.S. Supreme 
Court make radically different predictions about the impact of 
a new Justice on the Court. Using a new method for locating 
average majority opinion locations in a policy space, we test the 
predictions in a case study: the replacement of Justice Potter 
Stewart by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. We find a direct ef-
fect from the new Justice: O’Connor’s majority opinions were 
more conservative than Stewart’s and neither Justice’s majori-
ty opinions were located at the Court’s median. In addition, 
O’Connor’s appearance on the Court induced strong but varying 
peer effects among the other Justices: conservatives and most 
moderates wrote more conservative majority opinions while 
some liberals wrote somewhat more liberal opinions. These 
findings appear quite harsh to the Median Voter Model of Su-
preme Court decision making and diverge in important ways 
from the predictions of the Median Majority and Monopoly Au-
thor models. They appear somewhat friendlier to recent “author 
influence” theories. We discuss the implications for the Presi-
dent’s ability to shape the Court’s policy through appointments. 
The evidence suggests those opportunities are substantial. 
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I.  INTRODUCTORY FRAMEWORK   
Presidents have sharp tools for shaping judicial policy. 
Among these are:  
• Appointing faithful agents in federal law enforcement 
agencies who advance the President’s policy aims, for instance, 
in antitrust, voting rights, affirmative action, wire tapping and 
surveillance, drug enforcement, and immigration contexts;1 
• Selecting ideologically compatible judges for seats in the 
lower federal judiciary;2  
• Drafting or supporting court-curbing legislation in Con-
gress, with an aim toward intimidating a hostile or unreceptive 
Supreme Court;3 and 
• Mobilizing public opinion against a hostile Supreme 
Court, thereby pressuring the Justices.4 
History shows the potency of these tools.5 But as potent as 
they may be, the President’s “big gun” for shaping federal judi-
cial policy remains changing the makeup of the U.S. Supreme 
Court itself.  
Bringing the Supreme Court into a degree of ideological 
congruence is attractive to presidents, for at least four reasons. 
First, an ideologically congruent Supreme Court is unlikely to 
overturn key parts of the President’s legislative program.6 But 
 
 1. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 
6–8, 55–58 (2008). 
 2. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 
36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (“Every President in American history, 
to a greater or lesser extent, has chosen federal judges, in part, based on their 
ideology.”); see also Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, 
and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (1997) (noting the politici-
zation of decision making in environmental cases before the D.C. Circuit and 
how participating judges generally reflect the views held by the party of the 
appointing President).  
 3. See Thomas S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court-Curbing and 
Judicial Legitimacy 14–16 (Nov. 5, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~tclark7/constitutional.pdf (discussing 
various impetuses behind court-curbing legislation).  
 4. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 
78–79, 97–98, 117 (1989) (noting that a majority of Supreme Court decisions 
reflect public opinion and that the Supreme Court will seldom defy nationwide 
public opinion).  
 5. See sources cited supra notes 1–4 (discussing the effectiveness of these 
tools in varying circumstances).  
 6. See David A. Strauss, Memo to the President (and His Opponents): 
Ideology Still Counts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 49, 50 (2007), http://www 
.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/22/LRColl2007n22Strauss.pdf 
(discussing how President Franklin Roosevelt proposed legislation to reshape 
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more than this, an ideologically congruent Supreme Court can 
oversee the lower federal judiciary and encourage compliance 
with an administration’s goals even from judges unreceptive to 
the President’s aims.7 This is important when the courts them-
selves implement federal legal policy. Perhaps even more criti-
cally, however, a sympathetic federal judiciary creates a sup-
portive environment for the President’s men and women 
throughout the bureaucracy. Secure that the courts will uphold 
their decisions and protect them from subsequent prosecution 
or liability, the President’s appointees in the agencies can move 
with boldness, dispatch, and energy.8 Finally, an ideologically 
congruent Supreme Court can be a powerful ally in any legal or 
constitutional confrontation with a hostile or recalcitrant Con-
gress.  
It is important, however, not to overstate the case: for some 
presidents, federal legal and judicial policy is simply not a 
priority. Until the Steel Seizure case,9 for example, President 
Truman seems not to have seen the federal judiciary as valua-
ble for much except patronage.10 Such presidents may be con-
tent merely with a federal judiciary that does not actively 
thwart their ends. But given the size and reach of the modern 
administrative state,11 the scale and scope of federal law en-
forcement agencies and national security agencies,12 and the 
 
the Court, hoping to assure a majority in favor of his legislative programs, af-
ter the Supreme Court declared key features of the New Deal unconstitution-
al).  
 7. Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: 
An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 101, 113–14 (2000) (noting that the Court can use the certiorari 
process to enforce its doctrinal preferences throughout the judicial hierarchy).  
 8. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 396–97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing the value of a unitary executive where every 
magistrate would be personally responsible for his behavior, thereby allowing 
the chief magistrate to take swift and decisive action). 
 9. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 
(1952).  
 10. See SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 68–76 (1997) 
(“Truman and his administration primarily treated judgeships as patronage, 
in the service of the partisan agenda.”); DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF 
JUSTICES 20, 38–40 (1999) (discussing how President Truman wanted to feel a 
sense of “personal comfort” with and loyalty from his Supreme Court nomi-
nees). 
 11. See LEWIS, supra note 1, at 20–21 (“Today the federal government 
employs 2.5 million civilians in full-time positions . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security, Department Subcompo-
nents & Agencies, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ (last visited Apr. 13, 
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political saliency of some judicial actions—for instance, on bus-
ing, abortion, gun control, wire taps, and property rights13—
control of the federal judiciary is apt to be of at least moderate 
importance to all modern presidents and of vital importance to 
some. 
Given the potential rewards to the President from shaping 
the Court, the real issue becomes feasibility: under what cir-
cumstances can presidents use Supreme Court appointments to 
shape judicial policy? Analytically, four questions become criti-
cal:  
1. When can the President place an ideologically congru-
ent nominee on the Supreme Court, if he chooses to try? 
2. If the President places an ideologically congruent Jus-
tice on the Court, is that Justice likely to serve as a faithful 
agent or instead develop into an unpredictable maverick? 
3. How much difference can a faithful agent make in the 
Court’s policy output in the short term? 
4. How much difference can a faithful agent make in the 
long-term?  
In our view, the social scientific evidence indicates that a 
careful President can usually place an ideologically congruent 
nominee on the Court.14 And, the evidence suggests to us that 
 
2009) (“More than 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions at the federal, 
state, and local level have homeland security responsibilities.”). 
 13. Cf. Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 517, 532 (2006) (noting that judges may be less inclined to ad-
here to strict legal doctrine in cases where the political saliency of the issue is 
high).  
 14. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court 
Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525, 532 (1990) 
[hereinafter Cameron et al., Senate Voting] (noting that a strong President can 
successfully nominate a highly qualified and ideologically congruent Justice); 
Lee Epstein et al., The Increasing Importance of Ideology in the Nomination 
and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 631–35 
(2008) (noting that contemporary Justices “may be entrenching their Presi-
dent’s views into the law—and may be doing so long after he leaves office”). 
Collectively and consistently, these papers show that presidents can almost 
always place a nominee on the Court who is seen as well qualified. See, e.g., 
Charles M. Cameron & Jee-Kwang Park, Voting for Justices: Change and 
Continuity in Confirmation Voting 1937–2006, at 9–10 (2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors). More specifically, when the President’s co-
partisans control the Senate, he can place almost any reasonable nominee on 
the Court. See id. at 7. Even if the President’s copartisans do not control the 
Senate, a nominee will likely prove successful if her record is void of scandal-
ous behavior, partisan political involvement, or controversial activities and if 
she is manifestly well qualified for the job. See id. at 10; Epstein et al., supra 
at 628. And, even when the Senate rejects a nominee, the President can return 
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presidents who take the trouble to screen, groom, cultivate, re-
peatedly test, and promote cadres of probable soul-mates are 
very likely to identify and place consistent and reliable agents 
on the Court.15 Accordingly, we turn to the third question: 
What difference does a new Justice make, especially in terms of 
short-term policy? 
The central point of this Article is this: your answer de-
pends on your theory of the Court. More precisely, your answer 
depends on your understanding of how the characteristics of 
the Justices on the Court—especially their ideological commit-
ments—map into judicial or policy outcomes, especially on av-
erage or on average for important cases. How this mapping or 
aggregation works is the subject of contemporary social scien-
tific theories of collegial courts.16  
To illustrate, consider a concrete example: the replacement 
of Thurgood Marshall by Clarence Thomas. By most accounts, 
Marshall was one of the most liberal Justices who ever served 
on the High Court;17 Thomas is one of the most conservative 
 
with an ideologically similar person and achieve success. See Cameron et al., 
Senate Voting, supra at 532. 
 15. See STEVEN TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVE-
MENT 1–2 (2008) (identifying the fact that conservatives have made a con-
certed effort to find and place reliable agents on the Court); Ward Farnsworth, 
The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Assess Supreme Court Justices, 
with Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 1891, 1901–02 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
v101/n4/1891/LR101n4Farnsworth.pdf (noting that presidents can act to re-
duce the chances of future erratic ideological behavior while on the Court by 
choosing their agents more carefully); see also Charles M. Cameron & Jee-
Kwang Park, How Will they Vote? Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme 
Court Nominees, 1937–2006, at 4, 14–15, 22–24 (2007) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors), available at http://www.princeton.edu/ 
~ccameron/HowWillTheyVote.pdf (describing how improved measures predict 
future behavior better while also noting that the predictability of nominees 
has increased substantially over time). But see Lee Epstein et al., Ideological 
Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1493, 1497, 1519, 1526 (2007) (commenting that some 
Justices seem to change their voting behavior on case dispositions over time, 
thus calling into question the ability of presidents to place faithful agents on 
the Court).  
 16. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Me-
dian Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analy-
sis of “Natural Courts,” 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 57, 63 (2002); Keith Krehbiel, 
Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
231, 235, 238 (2007) (discussing the move-the-median model and its implica-
tion for Supreme Court appointments to shift policy objectives of the Court).  
 17. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epis-
temics, and the Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575, 624 (2005) (“For the 
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since the New Deal.18 What difference if any did this change in 
personnel make for policy outcomes between the last natural 
court19 on which Marshall served (Rehnquist 4)20 and the first 
natural court on which Thomas served (Rehnquist 5)? 
In thinking about how the Marshall-Thomas switch might 
make a difference we can distinguish three distinct potential 
mechanisms. These are:  
The direct effect—the difference in average content be-
tween the arriving Justice’s majority opinions and the depart-
ing Justice’s majority opinions. Were Thomas’s majority opi-
nions more conservative than Marshall’s?  
Peer effects—the difference in content between a continuing 
Justice’s majority opinions before and after the arrival of the 
new Justice. Did liberal Justice William Brennan’s opinions 
shift in a conservative direction after Thomas’s arrival? Or did 
they become even more liberal? How about the majority opi-
nions penned by conservative Justice William Rehnquist? 
Context distribution effects—the difference in critical deci-
sion contexts, such as opinion assignment or disposition coali-
tion, following the turnover in membership. Did liberal Justices 
receive fewer assignments of important cases, following the 
Marshall-Thomas switch, resulting in more conservative opi-
nions in important cases even absent any peer effects?21  
 
majority of Justice Marshall’s time on the Court, he was one of the most liber-
al members . . . .”). 
 18. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 37, 82 n.183 (2008) (noting commentary suggesting that Justice Thomas 
is “consistently the most conservative voter on the Court”). 
 19. A “natural court” refers to a Supreme Court whose membership is 
constant. The departure of a Justice marks the end of one natural court; the 
arrival of his or her replacement marks the beginning of the next. LEE EP-
STEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 313 (1994). Because the bar-
gaining dynamics on a multimembered court reflect its membership, natural 
courts (rather than annual terms, for instance) form the logical unit for study-
ing bargaining and coalition formation on the Supreme Court. See id. at 303–
13 for a listing of Supreme Court natural courts through 1993. 
 20. Throughout this Article, we label natural courts according to the clas-
sifications provided in Harold Spaeth’s database. See HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
ORIGINAL UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL DATABASE (2009), http:// 
www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm. The Spaeth database begins a natural 
court each time a Justice leaves or joins the Court. As a result, some natural 
courts identified by the Spaeth database have open seats. Professor Epstein et 
al. provide an alternative classification that begins a natural court each time a 
new Justice joins the Court. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 303–13.  
 21. To these one might add a case selection effect—the difference in type of 
cases selected following the turnover in membership. For instance: Did the 
new Court take more or fewer extremely consequential cases than did the pre-
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Expectations about these three effects depend on one’s 
theory of the Court. Suppose, for example, you adopt one com-
mon approach to understanding the Court, the Monopoly Au-
thor theory.22 According to this theory, authors write plurality 
opinions expressing their own policy preferences.23 So this 
theory predicts that opinions authored by Thomas will be vast-
ly different from those authored by Marshall. In other words, 
the direct effect for Thomas- versus Marshall-authored opi-
nions is predicted to be huge, perhaps even eye-popping. On the 
other hand, Monopoly Author theory predicts that the ideologi-
cal tenor of opinions authored by continuing Justice Brennan 
will be exactly the same across the two courts, as will those au-
thored by Justice Rehnquist in the two courts. In other words, 
the theory predicts zero peer effects. Since their ideologies were 
so similar, the theory also predicts that Brennan’s opinions will 
be similar in content to those authored by Marshall, and Rehn-
quist’s will be similar to Thomas’s. Consequently, if the opi-
nions assigned to Thomas would have gone to Marshall, and 
other assignments remain the same, Thomas’s impact on the 
Court’s average policy output would be substantial and equal to 
his direct decision impact (weighted by the number of cases in-
volved). Moreover, if Thomas’s presence on the Court allowed 
the redirection of important cases from liberals to conserva-
tives, then his impact on the new Court’s policy would be even 
greater, magnifying the direct effect. Conversely, though, if the 
cases assigned to Thomas all would have gone to Rehnquist, 
and those that would have gone to Marshall were just reas-
signed to Brennan, and all other cases retained their assign-
ments, Thomas’s impact on the Court’s average policy would be 
very modest: the distribution effect from his appointment 
would counteract or offset the direct decision effect. The Mono-
poly Author theory is silent about predicted context effects,24 
 
vious Court? We will not consider case selection effects in this Article. 
 22. The Monopoly Author theory can be seen as the game-theoretic ver-
sion of the earlier behavioralist “attitudinal model,” which asserted that Jus-
tices vote on the merits in accord with their personal ideologies. See JEFFREY 
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED 86–97 (2002) (discussing the attitudinal approach in de-
tail); see also infra Part III.C (discussing the Monopoly Author approach). 
 23. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22, at 86. 
 24. See THOMAS H. HAMMOND ET AL., STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY 
CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 52 (2005) (noting that Segal and 
Spaeth’s attitudinal model “did not provide any kind of carefully specified 
model” to predict “whether the justice’s earlier behavior is influenced by stra-
tegic considerations”).  
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but one might expect conservative Chief Justice William Rehn-
quist to use his administrative powers to exploit context effects, 
thereby magnifying Thomas’s impact.  
Other theories of the Supreme Court make quite different, 
even wildly different, predictions about the three effects. For 
example, consider surely the most prominent theory of Su-
preme Court decision making, the Median Voter (MV) ap-
proach.25 Theorists of nomination politics almost always as-
sume this theory.26 As explained in Part III, this theory holds 
that the content of the majority opinion corresponds to the 
wishes of the Court’s median voter, irrespective of who au-
thored the opinion or which Justices voted with the majority in 
the case’s disposition.27 In the Marshall-Thomas example, the 
Median Voter approach predicts a moderate direct effect rather 
than a large one, as the median moved moderately in a con-
servative direction. It predicts similarly moderate peer effects, 
rather than zero effects for all the continuing Justices. And, it 
predicts those peer effects will be identical for each and every 
continuing Justice. Finally, it holds that distribution effects are 
irrelevant rather than potentially consequential, since all ma-
jority opinions are predicted to have the same ideological con-
tent. 
Can we glean any evidence from the empirical record to 
show which theory or theories best accords with the facts, and 
which theories seem far off the mark? And, what do the better- 
performing theories imply about the President’s ability to 
shape the Court and its near-term policies? In this Article we 
hope to make progress in answering these questions. To do so, 
we carefully examine one case of judicial turnover, the re-
placement of Justice Potter Stewart by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor. We employ this case study primarily because the last 
natural court containing Justice Stewart (Burger 6) and the 
 
 25. See, e.g., id. at 79–215 (applying the Median Voter theorem to develop 
a formal model of strategic decision making on the Supreme Court); Epstein & 
Jacobi, supra note 18, at 44–49 (same).  
 26. See, e.g., Krehbiel, supra note 16, at 232–36; Bryon J. Moraski & 
Charles R. Shipan, The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of 
Institutional Constraints and Choices, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069, 1072–73 
(1999); David W. Rohde & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Advising and Consenting on 
the 60-Vote Senate: Strategic Appointments to the Supreme Court, 69 J. POL. 
664, 666–67 (2007). 
 27. See infra Part III.A (explaining the role of the Median Voter approach 
in Supreme Court decision making).  
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first containing Justice O’Connor (Burger 7) were so lengthy 
that they provide an abundance of data for comparison. 
The structure of the Article is as follows. In Part II we re-
view the measures of judicial preferences we employ and pro-
pose a new and feasible empirical method for estimating the 
average location in a policy space of a group of majority opi-
nions, for example, all the majority opinions authored by a par-
ticular Justice or all the majority opinions authored by a par-
ticular Justice in a particular dispositional coalition. In Part III 
we review the major contending theories of policymaking on the 
U.S. Supreme Court and draw out their implications for the 
policy impact of a new Justice. We emphasize predictions we 
can test with the Burger 6 and Burger 7 data. Part IV, the 
heart of the Article, presents the Stewart-O’Connor case study. 
In Part V we briefly discuss the implications of our findings for 
the President’s ability to shape the Court’s policy through ap-
pointments. 
We can summarize our principal findings succinctly. Al-
though opinion assignment patterns did shift somewhat be-
tween Burger 6 and Burger 7, the most important conse-
quences appear to be the direct and peer effects. The direct 
effect was sizeable: O’Connor’s opinions were considerably more 
conservative than Stewart’s. The switch also induced sizeable 
peer effects in the other Justices. However, these were not uni-
form: conservatives and right-leaning moderates tended to 
write more conservative opinions. In contrast, the most ex-
treme liberals and some left-leaning moderates wrote more lib-
eral opinions. These patterns appear quite harsh to many of the 
theories, especially the Median Voter theory. They appear 
friendlier to recent “author influence” theories. The implica-
tions for presidential power are very clear: every nomination 
can matter, not just those that move the median, and peer ef-
fects can be just as consequential as direct effects. In short, the 
President’s ability to shape judicial doctrine can be substantial, 
if he chooses to try.  
II. MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 
A.  THE JUSTICES’ PREFERENCES 
Modern theories of collegial courts typically assume judges 
have most-preferred policies or rules.28 In this sense, judges are 
 
 28. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Dissents Against Type, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
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assumed to be somewhat similar to congressmen, presidents, or 
knowledgeable engaged citizens. Legal scholars sometimes jus-
tifiably bristle at what can appear at times as an unreflective 
legal realism, but a half-century of data analysis demonstrates 
unequivocally that no theory of Supreme Court decision mak-
ing can get very far without positing a degree of policy prefe-
rences by the Justices.29 
Empirically estimating the Justices’ ideologies has been, 
and remains, a challenge. Roughly speaking, the state of the 
art has gone through three phases. First, analysts used the 
party of the appointing President as a proxy for ideology under 
the fairly reasonable but hardly perfect assumption that Re-
publican presidents tend to nominate conservatives and Demo-
cratic presidents tend to nominate liberals.30 The release of the 
U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Data Base31 allowed a somewhat 
more refined practice, however. The data’s compiler, Professor 
Harold Spaeth of Michigan State University, scored the dispo-
sition in each Supreme Court case since 1952 as “liberal” or 
“conservative,” based on the identity of the prevailing litigant.32 
Using Spaeth’s scoring, one can easily calculate the percentage 
of the time a Justice voted for Spaeth’s “liberal” case disposi-
tion. This percentage was widely used as a measure of judicial 
ideology during the 1990s.33 
Around 2000, judicial scholars began to adapt sophisticated 
scaling methods, originally developed by congressional scholars 
 
1535, 1536–37 (2009) (noting how most legal realists assume that judges vote 
according to their policy preferences); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeal and Su-
preme Courts, in VII ENCYCLOPEDIA LAW AND ECONOMICS, CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE 45, 54, 57 (2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/ 
7200book.pdf (noting in a survey of economic literature on judicial appeals and 
collegiality of courts that various authors assume judges have an ideal or 
most-preferred policy).  
 29. See Kornhauser, supra note 28, at 54, 57 (noting that a majority of 
Supreme Court decision-making theories assume that judges have policy pre-
ferences).  
 30. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American 
Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 221, 240–43 (1999) (analyzing 
numerous empirical studies that have sought to connect party identification 
with judicial ideology and concluding that political party affiliation “is a de-
pendable measure of ideology in modern American courts”).  
 31. SPAETH, supra note 20. 
 32. Id. at 53–55.  
 33. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: 
A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 252, 
303 (1997) (discussing Segal and Spaeth’s use of the Judicial Database in de-
signing their attitudinal model).  
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to infer congressmen’s ideologies from their roll call voting, and 
applied them to the Justices’ votes on case dispositions.34 These 
scaling methods typically estimate a one-dimensional policy 
scale and infer for each Justice a most-preferred or “ideal point” 
on the scale.35 Professor Ward Farnsworth has provided a non-
technical but sophisticated appreciation of the most widely 
used of these measures, the “Martin-Quinn” or MQ scores.36 As 
Farnsworth notes, the scaling technique is based on how simi-
lar the voting on case dispositions were for the Justices—
Justices who voted similarly are assigned similar scores, and 
Justices who vote differently receive different scores.37  
The MQ scale is centered on zero,38 with negative scores 
indicating liberal preference and positive scores indicating con-
servative preference. In fact, the MQ scores correlate very high-
ly with “percent liberal voting” scores; empirically, a zero life-
time MQ score translates into about fifty percent voting in the 
liberal direction.39 The similarity between the two scores is 
hardly surprising since both use essentially the same data—
votes on case dispositions. However, the MQ scores do not rely 
on Spaeth’s sometimes awkward “liberal”/“conservative” coding 
of case dispositions; rather, they employ the raw disposition 
 
 34. See Joseph Bafumi et al., Practical Issues In Implementing and Un-
derstanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 171, 171–87 
(2005); Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and 
Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433 
(2007); Grofman & Brazill, supra note 16, at 55–73; Andrew D. Martin & Ke-
vin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002). In fact, 
the scaling methods were originally developed by psychologists to infer latent 
variables like respondent ability (for example, IQ), based on test performance. 
See, e.g, R. Darrell Bock, A Brief History of Item Response Theory, 16 EDUC. 
MEASUREMENT: ISSUES AND PRACTICE 21, 21−33 (1997). From the perspective 
of so-called “item response theory,” each case is equivalent to a test question, a 
dispositional vote is equivalent to an answer to the question, and the inferred 
Justice ideology is equivalent to the respondent’s ability. See id. A given an-
swer is not assumed to be correct or incorrect, but rather it is assumed that 
discriminating questions can differentiate liberal and conservative answers. 
See id. 
 35. See Bailey, supra note 34, at 434; Martin & Quinn, supra note 34, at 
145–47. 
 36. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, passim. 
 37. See id. at 1892−94.  
 38. See Bailey, supra note 34, at 435 fig.2.  
 39. In similar fashion, the latent respondent ability measures recovered 
by item response theory typically correlate at .95 or better with the simple 
percentage of correct answers on the test.  
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votes themselves.40 In addition, the MQ scores use only non-
unanimous case dispositions, since unanimous disposition votes 
do not help distinguish the Justices ideologically.41 In essence, 
then, the MQ scores summarize each Justice’s demonstrated 
propensity to vote for liberal dispositions in non-unanimous 
cases. In turn, under some rather strong additional assump-
tions, these propensities can be seen as proxies for “ideal 























Marshall -2.000 .73 .72 1 1 
Brennan -1.294 .72 .70 2 2 
Stevens -0.440 .56 .55 3 3 
Blackmun -0.137 .45 .56 4 4 
Stewart 0.140 .49 — 5  (median) — 
White 0.176 .44 .42 6 5  (median) 
Powell 0.398 .39 .37 7 6 
O’Connor 0.780 — .37 — 7 
Burger 0.813 .34 .34 8 8 
Rehnquist 1.663 .23 .28 9 9 
Table 1. Disposition Scores for Justices on Burger 6 and Burger 7. 
Shown are constant “ideal point” Martin-Quinn (MQ) scores for the Justices on 
Burger 6 and Burger 7, derived from their voting associations in case disposi-
tions in non-unanimous disposition coalitions. Also shown is each Justice’s 
“liberal voting” in dispositions in each Court, as scored by Harold Spaeth. Fi-
nally shown is the ordinal rank order of each Justice on the Court, based on 
the constant MQ scores. 
 
Table 1 provides both the “liberal voting” and MQ scores 
for the Justices on Burger 6 and Burger 7. The liberal voting 
 
 40. See Farnsworth, supra note 15, at 1892–94 (“The Martin-Quinn me-
thod keeps track of only one thing: whether a Justice voted to affirm or reverse 
a case.”); Martin & Quinn, supra note 34, at 137. One must make a few other 
assumptions to tie down the direction of the scale, for example, by assuming 
that a well-known liberal like William Douglas identifies the liberal end of the 
scale. 
 41. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 34, at 137. 
 42. See Bailey, supra note 34, at 434. These assumptions include: no stra-
tegic voting on case dispositions, an unchanging mix of cases on the docket, no 
response by the Justices to outside pressure such as court-curbing legislation, 
and invariance of the scale to the entry and exit of Justices, among others.  
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scores are on Burger 6 and 7 alone, respectively. The MQ score 
is each Justice’s lifetime score.43 It will be seen that the rank-
ing generated by the measures is generally quite plausible, for 
example, Marshall and Brennan rank as the first and second 
most liberal Justices and Rehnquist and Burger rank as the 
most conservative and next most conservative Justices. Analy-
sis of a variety of other measures (for example, voting in non-
unanimous cases) suggests that the ordering of the three most 
liberal and three most conservative Justices on the two courts 
is very stable; the ordering in the middle can shift slightly de-
pending on which measure is used. Putting a great deal of con-
fidence in the MQ cardinal estimates requires more faith.44 
Again, though, the numbers appear fairly plausible. In some 
cases, several Justices have such similar scores that they seem 
almost interchangeable ideologically, for example, Stewart and 
White on Burger 6 and O’Connor and Burger on Burger 7. 
B.  AVERAGE OPINION LOCATIONS: THE JOIN TECHNOLOGY 
Contemporary theories of the Supreme Court focus on poli-
cymaking rather than dispute resolution.45 Consequently they 
highlight opinion content rather than case dispositions (wheth-
er the plaintiff or the defendant prevails). Determining which 
 
 43. Martin and Quinn have calculated yearly scores. See Martin & Quinn, 
supra note 34, at 146 tbl.1 (reporting posterior density of ideal points of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 1953–1999, for the constant ideal point model). But 
these scores are extremely unstable, and we doubt they provide much useful 
information beyond the lifetime scores. Michael Bailey has estimated similar 
scores. See Bailey, supra note 34. The Bailey scores are stabilized through 
“bridging techniques” used to “link actors across time and institutions.” Id. at 
433–34 (explaining data observations and measures used in the methodology). 
When Bailey’s scores are averaged over the two natural courts, they present a 
picture similar to the lifetime MQ scores and the court-specific percent liberal 
voting scores. These averages can be calculated from data at http://www 
.georgetown.edu/faculty/baileyma/Data.htm. 
 44. Cardinal scores for extreme Justices (i.e., Rehnquist and Marshall) 
can be particularly problematic since by definition there is no more extreme 
Justice with which to contrast the extremists’ voting behavior. As a result, the 
scaling methods have a hard time pinning down these Justices’ scores very 
precisely. 
 45. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES 
MAKE (1997) (providing a strategic model of judicial behavior premised on the 
theory that Justices’ votes are shaped by external factors as well as policy pre-
ferences); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22 (developing a behavioral model 
based on the presupposition that Justices’ votes are the product of their policy 
preferences).  
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party prevailed is straightforward, but measuring opinion con-
tent is hard. So, what can be done?46 
Among political scientists, the most frequently employed 
method for measuring opinion content is fact-pattern analy-
sis.47 This approach uses statistical methods to infer legal doc-
trine based on case dispositions in cases with given fact pat-
terns, for example, in search and seizure cases.48 When case 
dispositions for a given fact pattern change after a landmark 
case or cases, one can infer that the content of those cases 
changed doctrine.49 Unfortunately, it is not clear that typically 
employed statistical methods reliably detect doctrinal 
changes.50 And, scholars have raised questions whether com-
monly employed statistical methods can actually recover the 
underlying doctrines used by judges.51  
In an innovative paper, Tom Clark and Benjamin Lauder-
dale use patterns of favorable citations between cases to infer 
doctrinal similarity and dissimilarity between opinions, for ex-
ample, in search and seizure or freedom of expression cases.52 
Positing a formal model of citation practices, they structurally 
estimate the location of cases in a policy space as well as the 
ideal points or rules of the Justices.53 They then test some of 
 
 46. Theories of Supreme Court decision making can be tested indirectly, 
for example, by examining predicted patterns of opinion assignment, see Jeff-
rey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the 
Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276 (2007), or by examining patterns in 
vote fluidity, Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly T. Rader, Legal Constraints on Supreme 
Court Decision Making: Do Jurisprudential Regimes Exist?, 71 J. POL. (forth-
coming 2009) (manuscript at 2−4), available at http://www.columbia.edu/ 
~jrl2124/Random%20Regimes.pdf. We, however, emphasize opinion content 
because our focus is on policy content.  
 47. See, e.g., JEFFREY ALLAN SEGAL, PREDICTING SUPREME COURT CASES 
PROBABILISTICALLY: THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES, 1962−1981, at 3−15 
(1983).  
 48. Id.; Lax & Rader, supra note 46 (manuscript at 4, 20−21).  
 49. Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305–06 (2002) 
(positing that changes in the law form different “jurisprudential regimes” that 
influence relevant decision-making processes).  
 50. See Lax & Rader, supra note 46 (manuscript at 3–5).  
 51. Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Structure of Legal Rules and the Analysis 
of Judicial Decisions 4–13 (Jan. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960190#. 
 52. Tom S. Clark & Benjamin Lauderdale, Locating Supreme Court Opi-
nions in Doctrine Space (Mar. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~tclark7/doctrine.pdf. 
 53. Id. at 6–11. 
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the predictions of contemporary theories of the Court.54 Using 
their estimates, they find little support for the Median Voter 
(MV) approach—opinions do not appear to be located at the 
ideal point of the median Justice.55 Nor do they find much sup-
port for the Monopoly Author approach—majority opinion con-
tent does not appear to closely track the author’s preferences.56 
Instead, they find that majority opinions tend to cluster in the 
center of the disposition coalition.57 This finding affords some 
support for the Majority Median approach and possibly for the 
Entry Blocking and Gravitational Attraction models.58  
An advantage of Clark and Lauderdale’s scaling method is 
that it recovers a majority opinion location for individual cases. 
Unfortunately, though, it requires large amounts of coded cita-
tion data for each case and many related cases. Eventually it 
may be possible to apply this method to many different types of 
cases, but this possibility lies in the future.  
Here, we propose a new and extremely simple method, the 
“join technology,” for measuring the average opinion location 
for a group of majority opinions.59 The join technology cannot 
provide a precise measure of individual opinion locations. Over 
a series of opinions, however, it often yields a reasonable meas-
ure of average locations. The critical maintained assumption of 
the join technology is that a Justice is more likely to join a ma-
jority opinion as its proximity to her preferred rule increases. 
Conversely, the more distant the opinion, the less likely she is 
to join (that is, she is more likely to concur or dissent). Came-
ron and Kornhauser provide explicit micro-foundations for this 
idea,60 but it is so straightforward that it is compatible with all 
 
 54. Id. at 11–15; see also infra Part III. 
 55. Clark & Lauderdale, supra note 52, at 18–21.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. (“[The] results represent considerable evidence in support of the 
coalition median model, at least relative to the median justice and author mo-
nopoly models.”). 
 58. See infra Part III.  
 59. Precursor ideas can be found in Chad Westerland, Who Owns the Ma-
jority Opinion? An Examination of Policy Making on the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Aug. 29, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic 
.com/meta/p62042_index.html, and Cliff Carrubba et al., Does the Median Jus-
tice Control the Content of Supreme Court Opinions? (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv/groups/public/@nyu_law_ 
website_academics_colloquia_law_economics_and_politics/documents/ 
documents/ecm_pro_059079.pdf . We do not fully pursue these precursor ideas 
in this Article.  
 60. Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial 
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Figure 1. How Join Propensities Narrow Opinion Locations. In the fig-
ure, the case location (for example, the level of care exercised by Defendant) is 
shown by xˆ, the most-preferred opinion content of Justice i (for example, the 
standard of care) is shown by ix , and the content of the majority opinion by x. 
Each Justice’s dissent, join, or concur decision is indicated by the appropriate 
symbol—D, J, or C—in the boxes. Justices 3−7 are close enough to the opinion 
to endorse it via a join. Justices 8 and 9 are too distant. Justices 1 and 2 dis-
sent (so, the case disposition is 2−7). The opinion must be located to the right 
of the mid-point between Justice 2 and 3’s ideal rules, and to the left of the 
mid-point of Justices 7 and 8’s ideal rules. Different cases may expand or 
shrink the edges of the join region due to different saliency or writing costs, 
but if opinions are consistently located closer to Justice 5 than any other Jus-
tice, she will display the greatest propensity to join them. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea. Suppose a theory indi-
cates that majority opinions are located at Justice 5’s ideal rule. 
If so, Justice 5 is extremely likely to join a given majority opi-
nion while more distant Justices are less likely to do so. Over a 
series of majority opinions, the propensity of Justices to join 
opinions located at 5x may vary somewhat. For example, cases 
addressing some subject-matter areas may be highly important 
to the Justices, so even Justices close to 5x may refuse to join 
the opinion. Or, writing costs may be so high that even distant 
Justices may be inclined to join rather than write separately. 
But across a large number of cases, it will be Justice 5 who con-
sistently shows the greatest propensity to join, since she is the 
Justice most proximate to the majority opinion.  
At least three complications cause difficulties to this theory 
in practice. First, there are only nine Justices so the policy 
space is quite granular. For example, Justices 4 and 5 may both 
be highly inclined to join opinions written by a particular Jus-
 
Courts (3): Judicial Objectives, Opinion Content, Voting and Adjudication 
Equilibria (L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-54, 2008), 







D D J J J J J C C 
x
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tice, so we can say that opinions appear on average to be writ-
ten somewhere between the two of them. Unfortunately, 
though, this distance may be rather large. Second, the Justice 
assigned to author an opinion is very likely to join her own ma-
jority opinion even though she may have placed it some dis-
tance from her ideal rule. This is because writing a concurrence 
to her own opinion would require an even greater expenditure 
of effort. Not surprisingly, authors almost always join their own 
majority opinions.61 Consequently, the join decisions of the opi-
nion author are not particularly informative about the location 
of her opinion. Finally, the technology works much better for 
lopsided disposition coalitions (9−0, 8−1, 7−2) than narrow 
ones, especially the 5−4 disposition. This is because the join 
method uses the difference between joining and non-joining 
(concurring or dissenting) to identify the most likely location of 
the opinion. But in a 5−4 opinion, all the Justices in the dispo-
sition majority are likely to join the majority opinion to avoid a 
weaker judgment. Consequently, the join technology can only 
indicate “the opinion was somewhere on (say) the right side of 
the Court, not the left.”62  
 
 
 61. But see, for example, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 956, 990 (1996), 
where Justice O’Connor announced the judgment of the Court, wrote a first 
opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, and then 
wrote a second, unjoined concurring opinion.  
 62. The simple version of the join technology used here also assumes simi-
lar underlying join behavior by the Justices. If a particular Justice displayed 
idiosyncratic join tendencies—high or low—it would make detection of the 
most likely opinion location more difficult. Sophisticated statistical methods 
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Figure 2. Empirical Join Functions: Majority Opinions Authored by 
Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Brennan. The panels on the left show the em-
pirical join functions for the majority opinions of Justices Rehnquist, Black-
mun, and Brennan on Burger 6. The panels on the right show the similar join 
function for the same Justices on Burger 7. The dotted line indicates the pro-
pensity of the opinion author to join his own opinions. Observations are ar-
rayed by the Martin-Quinn score of the joining Justice. For example, in Burger 
6, Marshall (MQ Score = -2) joined Rehnquist’s majority opinions about twenty 
percent of the time, while Burger (MQ Score=.81) joined Rehnquist’s opinions 
over ninety percent of the time. The pattern of joins suggests Rehnquist placed 
his majority opinions near Burger’s ideal rule. 
 
Despite these limitations, the join technology often can be 
quite revealing. Figure 2 illustrates the join technology with ac-
tual data from the Burger 6 and Burger 7 natural courts. Each 
panel concerns the majority opinions written by a single Jus-
tice. For example, the top panel of Figure 2 examines the ma-
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each figure is the probability of joining that author’s opinions, 
where a score of 1.0 means a 100% probability of joining. The x-
axis shows the estimated ideology of the Justices on the natural 
court other than the author, using the constant MQ scores. For 
example, in Burger 6, Justice Marshall (MQ Score = -2) joined 
Rehnquist’s opinions about twenty percent of the time, while 
Chief Justice Burger (MQ Score = .81) joined Rehnquist’s opi-
nions over ninety percent of the time. The inference is that, on 
average, Rehnquist placed his opinions near Burger’s most-
preferred policy and far from Marshall’s. This appears to be 
true in both Burger 6 and Burger 7. 
Estimating the mostly likely average placement of Black-
mun’s majority opinions in Burger 6 is also easy: they also 
seem to have been located near Burger. The pattern in Black-
mun’s Burger 7 majority opinions is somewhat more compli-
cated since two distinct locations display nearly identical high 
percentages of joins. But a reasonable supposition is that 
Blackmun’s opinions were located between Justice White (MQ 
Score = .176) and Blackmun himself (MQ Score = -.137). Thus, 
Blackmun’s majority opinions seem to shift left, between the 
two courts.  
The pattern for Brennan’s opinions in Burger 6 suggests he 
wrote two rather distinct sets of majority opinions, one quite 
liberal, the other calculated to appeal to moderates. But most 
seem to have been quite liberal. The location of his opinions in 
Burger 7 is more clear-cut: to the left, near Justice Marshall.  
To understand the broader applicability of this new join 
technology, it is first useful to lay out the structure of existing 
Supreme Court predictive theories. 
III.  NOMINEE IMPACT: WHAT THE THEORIES PREDICT   
Until recently, neither political scientists nor legal scholars 
considered the relationship between the Court’s ideological 
make-up and the content of its majority opinions carefully 
enough to specify plausible links between the two. Instead, po-
litical scientists focused on empirical studies of individual Jus-
tices’ voting behavior and, as a result, almost exclusively on 
voting over case dispositions.63 While interesting, this line of 
inquiry by its very nature cannot provide a foundation for ana-
lyzing what difference a new Justice makes for the Court’s poli-
 
 63. See generally EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 19 (calculating many voting 
indices based on dispositional votes).  
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cies. Just to be clear: such studies can indicate, for instance, 
that Justice i votes liberally sixty percent of the time on case 
dispositions and her replacement, Justice i′ , votes liberally 
twenty percent of the time. Or, that Justice i’s voting on case 
dispositions suggests an “ideal point” of .14 while that of his re-
placement suggests one of .78. But this tells us nothing about 
the content of the Court’s majority opinions. For that, we need a 
theory about how voting predilections on case dispositions or 
the inferred “ideal points” map into majority opinion content. 
Fortunately, the theoretical landscape of judicial politics 
has changed dramatically, and in a remarkably brief time (bas-
ically since 2005).64 At present there are five distinct theories 
or approaches to Supreme Court decision making, each based 
on an explicitly formalized or semi-formalized game-theoretic 
model of decision making on a collegial court. Each of these 
theories predicts quite clearly how the make-up of the Court 
translates into the (general) content of plurality opinions, given 
case characteristics and relevant decision contexts like opinion 
assignment or disposition coalition. The five theories are: (1) 
the Median Voter (MV) approach;65 (2) the Majority Median 
(MM) model;66 (3) the Monopoly Author (MA) approach;67 (4) 
the Entry Blocking (EB) model;68 and (5) the Gravitational At-
traction (GA) model.69  
 
 64. An important precursor to contemporary theory is Edward P. 
Schwartz, Policy, Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of Supreme Court 
Decision-Making, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 219 (1992), which first attempted to 
adapt median voter models to collegial courts, id. at 219−21. Another impor-
tant precursor is Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal 
Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992), which created a framework, adopted 
in much recent work, that allows one to distinguish case locations, case dispo-
sitions, and opinion content. See id. at 443−59. 
 65. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24; Lax & Cameron, supra note 46. 
In essence, the theory argues that the Supreme Court is like the floor of Con-
gress (open-rule). Id. at 276.  
 66. See Carrubba et al., supra note 59. This theory argues that voting on 
dispositions is always sincere, and that the majority is something like an open-
rule Congress, where there is free debate and amendments can be proposed 
from the floor. Id. at 15–18.  
 67. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24; Cameron & Kornhauser, supra 
note 60; Lax & Cameron, supra note 46. In this model, the Supreme Court is 
like the closed-rule floor of Congress, where time limits are set on debate and 
no amendments may be made from the floor. Id. at 276−77.  
 68. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46. Here, writing costs afford the au-
thor some monopoly power. Id. at 276−80.  
 69. See Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 60. In this model, authors like 
proximate opinions but seek joins. Id. at 13. 
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As we have emphasized, however, if one wants to evaluate 
the policy impact of a new appointee, one cannot take case cha-
racteristics or decision contexts like opinion assignment and 
disposition coalition as fixed, since they themselves are likely to 
reflect the composition of the Court and thus change as the 
Court’s makeup changes. Unfortunately (but probably not sur-
prisingly) much less progress has been made in theorizing how 
the make-up of the Court affects case selection, opinion as-
signment, and disposition coalitions. In some cases, though, the 
new theories make such strong predictions that we can perceive 
their implications in these areas too.  
A.  MEDIAN VOTER APPROACH 
Suppose there is a potential candidate opinion that would 
beat or tie any other conceivable candidate opinion in a pair-
wise majority vote. In voting theory, such a candidate is known 
as a “Condorcet winner.”70 The Median Voter (MV) approach 
assumes the Court’s decision context is such that a Condorcet-
winning opinion always exists, and that the Court employs a 
decision process that actually selects this Condorcet-winning 
proposal.71 Scholars often assume that Congress’s “open rule” 
procedure, in which a given proposal may be amended though 
majority vote thereby yielding pair-wise votes between compet-
ing proposals that continue until finally a proposal emerges 
that cannot be beaten by another proposal (a Condorcet win-
ner), is applicable in the judicial context.72 The circumstances 
under which a Condorcet winner is guaranteed to exist are very 
well understood, and the authors of MV models are careful to 
assume those conditions. As it happens, the Condorcet winner 
is typically the ideal point of the MV, when conditions are such 
 
 70. See PETER C. ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER 80−86 (1992) 
(providing a description of the conditions under which voting rules select a 
Condorcet winner).  
 71. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24 (applying the MV model directly 
to the study of judicial decision making). The MV approach also emerges as a 
special case in several other models of the Supreme Court. See Carrubba et al., 
supra note 59, at 26−28 (explaining that the MV model emerges when the case 
disposition is unanimous); Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 279−83 (recog-
nizing that the MV model emerges when authoring costs are zero).  
 72. See Carrubba et al., supra note 59, at 3 (“[C]onsiderable empirical evi-
dence reveals the influential position of the median in legislative settings.”). 
The MV theorem does not require an actual dynamic process, as the players 
may be able to identify the Condorcet proposal and offer it immediately. See 
David P. Baron, A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs, 90 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 316, 316−30 (1996) (detailing a dynamic version of the MV model).  
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that it is meaningful to speak of a MV (for example, the ideal 
points of the Justices can be arrayed left-to-right on a line, as 
in Figure 1, and preferences are “single-peaked” so that a policy 
closer to one’s ideal point is more attractive than one farther 
away).  
The MV approach makes several extraordinary predictions 
about the location of majority opinions.73 First, the model pre-
dicts that on a natural court every majority opinion has the 
same location: the ideal policy of the median Justice (the me-
dian prediction).74 As a corollary, the model predicts that ma-
jority opinion locations on a natural court do not vary irrespec-
tive of which Justice authored the opinion (the author-
independence prediction).75 In addition, the model predicts that 
opinion locations do not vary regardless of which Justices com-
prised the dispositional majority in the case, what disposition 
the case received, or the type of case under consideration.76  
The impact of a new Justice is thus straightforward: it is 
simply the change (if any) in the location of the ideal point of 
the Court’s median Justice.77 In fact, one can say a good deal 
more, because of the nature of medians. If a Justice to the left 
of the old median is replaced by one to the right of the old me-
dian, then the new median shifts right, but only as far as the 
ideal point of the Justice on the right most proximate to the old 
median.78 Similarly, if a Justice to the right of the median is 
 
 73. Indeed, the MV approach laid out by Hammond et al. does not distin-
guish between joins and concurrences; case location likewise plays no role in 
the model. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24, at 260. This is not surprising 
as the standard MV model was originally developed to study settings like 
committees or legislatures, in which policymaking does not involve dispute 
resolution. See id. at 75 (recognizing that much of the original research “in-
volve[d] research on committee decision-making by majority rule”); Carrubba 
et al., supra note 59, at 1 (“[C]onsiderable empirical evidence reveals the in-
fluential position of the median voter in legislative settings.”). The MV ap-
proach emerges as a special case in the Entry Blocking model, which does gen-
erate case dispositions. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 279−83. But 
that model portrays dispositions as wholly incidental to opinion location; opi-
nion location is taken as central. Id.  
 74. See Carrubba et al., supra note 59, at 15−20 (“If judicial decisions . . . 
involve a single, dominant dimension, a straightforward application of the 
median-voter theorem suggests that the median justice should exercise deci-
sive influence over the content of opinions.”). 
 75. See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 16, at 58−63 (stating that the 
“identity of the median justice is frequently shifting”). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Krehbiel, supra note 16, at 233 (describing the effect of a new 
member on the location of the median voter). 
 78. See id. at 233−34 (explaining that assumption of a MV theory of the 
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replaced by one to the left, then the median shifts left, but only 
as far as the ideal point of the Justice on the left most prox-
imate to the old median. Same-side departures and arrivals do 
not affect the location of the median at all.79 In general, shifts 
in the median are apt to be rather small even if the ideal points 
of the exiting Justice and entering Justice are dramatically dif-
ferent. The sole exception is a highly polarized court when a 
departure and arrival flips the median from one extreme block 
to the other.80  
This aspect of the MV approach has strong implications for 
the peer effects arising from a new Justice: the movement in 
the median (if any) will be reflected exactly and identically in 
every Justice’s majority opinions and the majority opinions 
arising from every disposition coalition, case disposition, case 
type, or case location (the uniform-shift prediction).81 
If the MV model is correct, the median, author-
independence, and uniform shift predictions should all be on 
display in empirical join functions like those in Figure 2. How-
ever, a somewhat more convenient way to evaluate these hypo-
theses involves an “author-opinion” diagram, as shown in Fig-
ure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Median Voter Approach: The Predicted Author-Opinion Di-
agrams for Burger 6 and Burger 7. Opinions are predicted to lie at the 
 
Court is at the heart of the nominations theories). 
 79. See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 16, at 58−63.  
 80. See id. 
 81. See Krehbiel, supra note 16, at 234 (noting that a new Justice on the 
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same location, the ideal point of the median Justice, regardless of the author. 
Thus, the predicted line in the figure is the horizontal line located at the me-
dian ideal point. Because the median shifts negligibly between the two courts, 
the horizontal lines in the two figures are almost identical.  
 
The author-opinion diagram arrays the best estimate of a 
Justice’s average majority opinion location (derived from an 
analysis of the empirical join function for his majority opinions) 
against his ideology score. If the author-independence hypothe-
sis is correct, all the Justices on a natural court will place their 
majority opinions at the same location, so the hypothesis pre-
dicts a flat line in the diagram. If the MV hypothesis is correct, 
that flat line will be located at the ideal point of natural court’s 
median Justice. If the uniform-shift prediction is correct, the 
location of each and every continuing Justice’s average opinion 
location will shift in exactly the same way across two adjacent 
natural courts, which will be approximately zero in the case of 
Burger 6 and Burger 7 (since the median changes only negligi-
bly). The resulting predictions for Burger 6 and Burger 7 are 
shown in Figure 3. 
B.  MAJORITY MEDIAN APPROACH 
The Majority Median (MM) approach creates an intriguing 
variant on the MV approach by adding case locations and dis-
positions to the MV approach.82 The basic idea is as follows: 
suppose a Justice faces a utility loss from supporting a case 
disposition she sees as “wrong.” For example, in Figure 1, a 
Justice with an ideal rule lying to the left of the case location 
should favor one disposition in the indicated case; a Justice 
with ideal point lying to the right of the case location should fa-
vor the other. If a Justice instead joins or concurs in an opinion 
requiring the “incorrect” disposition, she might feel uneasy be-
cause justice has not been fully served in the instant case—she 
would suffer a “dispositional loss.”83 Some scholars posit that 
dispositional losses are so high in every instance that a Justice 
will never support an opinion yielding the wrong disposition no 
 
 82. See Carrubba et al., supra note 59, at 2, 15−20 (laying out the founda-
tional analysis for the MM approach); Westerland, supra note 59, at 8 (specu-
lating prior to Carrubba et al.’s work that such a theory could exist and might 
be useful in studying the Court). 
 83. See Carrubba et al., supra note 59, at 9 (recognizing that the MM 
model “assume[s] that the justices care about the disposition of the case”). 
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matter how attractive the opinion might otherwise be in terms 
of its content.84 
If this assumption is correct, Justices whose ideal rules lie 
on the “minority side” of the case location (that is, those in the 
minority of a disposition coalition) are effectively removed from 
the Court, at least with respect to bargaining over the content 
of the majority opinion.85 This is because no compromises or 
modifications of the majority opinion will ever induce them to 
switch their dispositional vote.86 If one further assumes the 
Justices in the majority coalition employ some Condorcet-
compatible procedure, one is led to the MM approach. 
The predictions of the MM approach are almost as remark-
able as those of the MV theory. First, opinions are predicted to 
lie at the ideal point of the MM of the majority disposition coa-
lition in a case (the majority median prediction).87 So, for ex-
ample, in a 5−4 disposition, the opinion is predicted to lie at the 
ideal point of Justice 3 (the median of Justices 1−5), while in a 
4−5 disposition, the opinion is predicted to lie at the ideal point 
of Justice 7 (the median of Justices 5−9). Similarly, opinions in 
a 7−2 disposition should lie at the ideal point of Justice 4, while 
those in a 2−7 opinion should lie at the ideal point of Justice 6. 
The difference in the locations of these medians implies a swing 
prediction across disposition coalitions. Figure 4 indicates the 
MM approach’s swing predictions in Burger 6 and Burger 7. Al-
though time and space limitations preclude much investigation 
of the swing predictions here, note the special role of the un-
animous coalition (0−9 or 9−0): the median of this coalition is 
the Court’s overall median, Justice 5. 
 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“[A] justice will not be indifferent as to a rule that is 
a bit more conservative . . . [or] liberal than she would like but yields the oppo-
site outcome in that particular case.”).  
 85. See id. at 15 (“[B]argaining over the majority opinion proceeds only 
among the justices who prefer the disposition adopted by the majority.”). 
 86. See id. at 12 (“Switching sides would require the justices to support a 
disposition with which they disagree, and they are not willing to do so if they 
care enough about the disposition.” (citation omitted)). 
 87. See id. at 7 (“[O]ur model predicts that median members of the majori-
ty coalition will have disproportional influence over the content of opinions.”); 
see also Westerland, supra note 59, at 14 (“Disagreements about the outcome 
of a case preclude agreement on the majority opinion, which means the major-
ity coalition could be an autonomous bargaining unit.”). 
 2009] IMPACT OF A NEW JUSTICE 1845 
 
 
Figure 4. The Majority Median Model’s “Swing Predictions” in Burger 
6 and Burger 7. Shown on the x-axis are the 10 possible disposition coali-
tions, 0−9, 1−8, and so on, to 9−0. The y-axis shows the predicted opinion loca-
tion in MQ space for each disposition coalition in the respective natural court. 
Note that in the unanimous coalition (9−0 and 0−9) the predicted location is 
the median Justice’s ideal point. 
 
A third remarkable prediction of the MM model is analog-
ous to the author-independence prediction of the MV model: 
within a given disposition coalition, opinion locations are pre-
dicted to be independent of the identity of the opinion’s author. 
Call this the disposition-author independence prediction.88 
Again, a particularly important instance of the disposition-
author independence prediction occurs in the unanimous coali-
tion where all opinions are predicted to be located at the ideal 
point of Justice 5 irrespective of the author of the opinion, ex-
actly as in the MV model.  
A fourth prediction of the MM approach is analogous to the 
uniform-shift prediction in the MV approach: within a given 
disposition across two courts, the opinions of all Justices are 
predicted to shift identically, with that shift governed by the 
change in the median of the disposition coalition. Call this peer 
effect prediction the disposition uniform-shift prediction.89 
 
 88. See Carrubba et al., supra note 59, at 1 (“[T]he median justice typical-
ly does not determine the content of Supreme Court decisions.”); Grofman & 
Brazill, supra note 16, at 58−63 (noting that the “identity of the median justice 
is frequently shifting”). 
 89. See Westerland, supra note 59, at 16 (“The only way an opinion author 
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Again, an important example occurs in the unanimous disposi-
tion, in which the MM model’s prediction is exactly the same as 
the MV approach’s prediction. In other words, in Burger 6 and 
Burger 7, the MM approach predicts (near) zero peer effects for 
all continuing Justices. 
MM model predictions can be summarized in author-
opinion diagrams similar to Figure 3, with one for each distinc-
tive disposition coalition (e.g., 5−4 or 4−5). A critical disposition 
coalition is the unanimous disposition, which is typically the 
most prevalent disposition coalition in a natural court. The 
predictions are in fact identical to those of the MV approach, 
exactly as summarized in Figure 3.90 
 
Table 2A (Burger 6) 
 9−0 8−1 7−2 6−3 5−4 Total 
Marshall 33 6 9 6 4 58 
Brennan 18 4 13 14 11 60 
Stevens 16 4 11 20 11 62 
Blackmun 16 2 13 12 21 64 
Stewart 13 6 13 14 17 62 
White 10 11 11 16 17 65 
Powell 14 7 15 19 13 68 
Burger 22 3 11 17 6 59 
Rehnquist 19 5 13 18 15 70 
Total 161 48 109 136 115 569 
 
Table 2B (Burger 7) 
 9−0 8−1 7−2 6−3 5−4 Total 
Marshall 37 4 1 12 8 62 
Brennan 19 5 4 10 22 60 
Stevens 28 4 8 14 10 64 
Blackmun 28 7 3 13 14 65 
White 25 4 9 20 22 80 
Powell 21 13 6 14 25 79 
O’Connor 13 15 12 13 12 65 
Burger 29 9 10 12 7 67 
Rehnquist 32 7 12 13 18 82 
Total 232 68 65 121 138 624 
Table 2. Number and Distribution of Majority Opinions by Justice and 
by Disposition Coalition in Burger 6 and Burger 7. Table 2A shows as-
 
preferable to a majority of justices in the coalition is to write the opinion at the 
median of the majority coalition.”). 
 90. The author-opinion diagram for any other “connected” disposition coa-
lition (say, 7−2, composed of the first seven Justices in the majority and Burg-
er and Rehnquist in the minority) would be a horizontal line, as in Figure 3, 
but located at the predicted location for that coalition shown in Figure 4. 
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signments in Burger 6; table 2B displays those from Burger 7. Included are 
only cases in which all nine Justices participated and that resulted in a signed 
opinion. 
 
Table 2 provides helpful context in thinking about disposi-
tion coalitions on Burger 6 and Burger 7. The table displays the 
frequency of each of the five standard dispositions as well as 
opinion assignments within each disposition, for Burgers 6 and 
7.91 The unanimous disposition was by far the most prominent 
in both Courts, comprising twenty-eight percent of the disposi-
tion coalitions in Burger 6 and thirty-seven percent in Burger 
7.  
A final implication of the MM approach bears mention. Be-
cause opinion locations are determined by the medians in the 
disposition coalitions, the net impact of a new Justice depends 
not only on her impact on the location of those disposition me-
dians but also on her impact on the frequency with which dif-
ferent dispositions occur. In fact, even if a new Justice altered 
no disposition medians at all, her presence could substantially 
change average opinion locations if some disposition coalitions 
became less frequent and others become more frequent. For ex-
ample, the unanimous disposition became more frequent in 
Burger 7 than in Burger 6. If the MM approach is correct, such 
context distribution effects can be extremely important. 
C.  MONOPOLY AUTHOR APPROACH 
The Monopoly Author (MA) approach, as well as the two 
remaining approaches, are author-influence theories: they pre-
dict that majority opinions reflect the preferences of the opinion 
author.92 Of the three author-influence theories, the Monopoly 
Author (MA) approach is conceptually the simplest. It asserts 
that the majority opinion author writes an opinion at her own 
ideal policy (the author-ideal point prediction).93 The author-
 
 91. The data in the table do not distinguish between a 7−2 and 2−7 coali-
tion, and concern only those cases in which all nine Justices participated.  
 92. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24, at 110. 
 93. See Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 60, at 23. The MA approach 
has a historic connection with the so-called attitudinal model of Segal and 
Spaeth, which asserts that Justices are free to vote or write opinions as they 
please. See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 22. Unlike the attitudinal 
model, however, the MA approach is a theory of Supreme Court decision mak-
ing. Consequently, the individual behavior asserted by Segal and Spaeth must 
emerge endogenously in a bargaining game played by the Justices. Hammond 
et al. root one version of the MA approach in a well-known model of take-it-or-
leave-it bargaining. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24, at 111; see also Tho-
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ideal point prediction implies that the direct effect from the 
new arrival is exactly equal to the distance between the ideal 
points of the arriving and departing Justices.94 Call this the 
ideal point-difference prediction. The author-ideal point predic-
tion also implies a zero peer effect for all the continuing Justic-
es. Thus, Justice Powell, for example, should locate his opinions 
in the same place in both Burger 6 and Burger 7. Call this the 
turnover invariance prediction. Figure 5 displays the distinctive 
Monopoly Author predictions, using an author-opinion dia-
gram. As shown, opinions should lie on a 45-degree line. 
 
Figure 5. Monopoly Author Approach: The Predicted Author-Opinion 
Diagrams for Burger 6 and Burger 7. Opinions are predicted to lie at the 
author’s ideal point. Thus, the predicted line in each figure is a 45-degree line. 
Each continuing author is predicted to write opinions at the same location in 
both courts. Stewart and O’Connor are predicted to write at different locations 
(their ideal points), and the difference in the locations of their opinions is pre-
dicted to be the difference in their ideal points (about .64 in the Martin-Quinn 
space).  
 
Because of the author ideal-point prediction, opinion as-
signment is absolutely vital in the MA approach. Even if a Jus-
tice with a given ideal point were replaced by a Justice with ex-
actly the same ideal point, average opinion locations could still 
 
mas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled 
Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27–29 (1978). The Entry 
Blocking model contains the MA approach as a special case, when entry costs 
for authors other than the designated author are very high. See infra Part 
III.D. The Gravitational Attraction model also yields an MA result as a special 
case, when an opinion author is centrally located within a dense cluster of 
ideal points. See infra Part III.E.  
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shift if assignment patterns altered. Because the Chief Justice 
has such authority in opinion assignment,95 the MA approach 
implies that the Chief might systematically bend the content of 
cases he cares about by assigning them to ideological allies. 
However, the data in Table 2 seem to suggest evenly distri-
buted case disposition in Burger 6, with a slight conservative 
bias in Burger 7. 
D.  ENTRY BLOCKING APPROACH 
As positive political theorists have struggled to model col-
legial courts, they have become much more sensitive to features 
of adjudication that distinguish courts from other institutions. 
Increasingly, theorists try to incorporate these features into 
formal models. The Entry Blocking (EB) model is one such ap-
proach.96 The EB model incorporates legal quality97 and writing 
costs98 into a median voter-style model of adjudication.99 In the 
model, writing a high quality opinion is costly of time and ef-
fort. This writing cost affords the assigned author some slack in 
positioning the opinion; as a result, he can pull an opinion away 
from the median Justice toward his own ideal point.100 Howev-
er, if it goes too far, an opponent on the opposite side of the 
Court will be willing to bear counter-writing costs, enter with 
an attractive opinion, and flip the median Justice’s vote.101 We 
dub this model the Entry Blocking approach because the con-
tent of the majority opinion is shaped largely by the need to 
block entry by winning counter-opinions from the opposite side 
 
 95. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 292 (“If the Chief Justice is a 
member of the initial majority coalition (empirically, this is by far the most 
common occurrence), he/she assigns the opinion; if not, the senior justice in 
the majority does so.”).  
 96. See HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 24, at 66–67; Lax & Cameron, supra 
note 46, at 278–80. 
 97. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 279 (defining legal quality as 
“clarity, persuasiveness, completeness, or craftsmanship”). 
 98. See id. at 295 (“[E]ach justice must decide how to allocate effort across 
all the cases in his/her current portfolio of cases, and the Chief or other justice 
who assigns an opinion must consider the consequences of a heavier workload 
not only for the resolution of the instant case but also for all the others in the 
assignee’s portfolio.”). 
 99. See id. at 276. But see Carrubba et al., supra note 59, at 5 (arguing 
that the requirement that the Court produce not only a judgment affirming or 
rejecting the lower court’s position but also a new judicial rule, will “drive a 
wedge between the content of opinions and the preferred position of the me-
dian justice”).  
 100. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 276. 
 101. See id. at 288. 
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of the Court.  
The MV and MA models emerge as special cases in the EB 
model, given extreme values of parameters. In general, howev-
er, the results in the EB model are intermediate between those 
polar extremes. For example, the model predicts opinion au-
thors can pull opinions somewhat away from the median to-
ward their ideal point.102 Consequently if the ideal points of the 
departing and arriving Justices are different, the opinions au-
thored by the two are apt to take different locations, resulting 
in a modest direct effect prediction.103 At the same time, the 
median voter exerts a pull on opinions so that shifts in the me-
dian are apt to be reflected somewhat in the opinions of the 
continuing Justices. We call this the modest peer effect predic-
tion.  
Perhaps the most striking prediction, however, is that all 
opinions will lie in the interval between the opinion author and 
(approximately) the median Justice—the critical interval pre-
diction.104  
 
 102. The EB model makes particularly clear predictions about the quality 
of opinions, as a function of the author’s ideal point and other variables. See 
id. at 282. We cannot address these predictions here, however. 
 103. For example, Segal and Spaeth demonstrated how the appointment of 
Thurgood Marshall solidified the liberal cohesion of the Warren Court. See 
Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Decisional Trends on the Warren and 
Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICA-
TURE 103, 107 (1989). Conversely, “the substitution of Clarence Thomas for 
Thurgood Marshall moved the Rehnquist Court to the right—but not enough 
to make it a coherent Court.” Neal Devins, Ideological Cohesion and Precedent 
(or Why the Court Only Cares About Precedent When Most Justices Agree with 
Each Other), 86 N.C. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2008).  
 104. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 287 (postulating that since 
“[e]very nonmedian opinion is vulnerable to some counteroffer,” an opinion 
writer must be as concerned with the stability of his or her opinion—that is, 
its proximity to the median—as with quality and precedent). 
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Figure 6. Entry Blocking Approach: The Predicted Author-Opinion 
Diagrams for Burger 6 and Burger 7. Exact opinion locations depend sen-
sitively on parameters such as the author’s expertise and the case’s difficulty. 
But opinions should lie between the author’s ideal point and (approximately) 
that of the median Justice. This region, the “critical region,” is shown by the 
hatched area in the figure. For similar cases, the model predicts a moderate 
direct effect and zero peer effects, since the median and extreme opposition 
Justices change so little. 
 
Figure 6 indicates the critical interval prediction. The criti-
cal interval (indicated in the figure by the hatched region) is de-
fined by the distance between a 45-degree line and a horizontal 
line at the median Justice’s location: all opinions should lie in 
this region. In particular, an author has no incentive to place 
an opinion farther from his ideal point, away from the median 
Justice. While the prediction is apt to be satisfied very easily 
for authors on the extremes of the Court, it may have bite for 
those more interior. Because opinion authors influence case lo-
cations so strongly, opinion assignment is critical in the EB 
model.105 Consequently, context effects can be important. In the 
context of Burger 6 and Burger 7, the EB model implies a mod-
est direct effect, zero or near-zero peer effects, and opinions ly-
ing within the critical region.  
E.  GRAVITATIONAL ATTRACTION APPROACH 
The Gravitational Attraction (GA) model examines the 
trade-off facing a majority opinion writer: craft an ideologically 
appealing opinion or craft one that can command more joins 
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and hence offer greater clarity or precedential value.106 In the 
model, opinion authors may move their opinion away from their 
most preferred rule toward dense, nearby clusters of ideal 
points to secure more joins. They may even be forced to do this 
to secure enough joins to form a majority opinion. Because 
nearby clusters of ideal points exert this “pull” on opinions, we 
call this approach the gravitational attraction model.107  
The location of majority opinions in the GA model depends 
on many factors, including the exact distribution of ideal 
points, the location of the case (if dispositional value is impor-
tant), and the importance to the author of garnering joins in 
the particular case. Thus, it is difficult to summarize the pre-
dictions of the model as neatly as some of the other approaches. 
However, it is easy to calculate predicted opinion locations giv-
en specific parameter values. Figure 7 displays predicted opi-
nion locations in Burger 6 and Burger 7 for “moderate” parame-
ter values.108 
 
Figure 7. Gravitational Attraction Approach: The Predicted Author-
Opinion Diagrams for Burger 6 and Burger 7. For “moderate” parameter 
values, liberal authors write somewhat liberal opinions; moderates offer opi-
 
 106. See Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 60, at 11. 
 107. See id. at 30. 
 108. The Mathematica computer code used to generate these estimates is 
available on request from the authors. By “moderate” values we mean non-
zero but not huge writing costs, and non-zero but not overwhelming impor-
tance of case clarity. In the example, case disposition value is set to zero, as 
would hold not only for extreme case locations resulting in a unanimous dispo-
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nions near the center of the Court; and conservatives offer somewhat conserv-
ative opinions. Very extreme authors locate their opinions surprisingly cen-
trally, as they pursue joins. The direct effect is predicted to be moderately 
large, while peer effects can be non-zero for some Justices. Shown for reference 
are 45-degree and median lines. 
 
In Figure 7, very extreme Justices locate their opinions 
strongly toward the center, seeking joins. This is a typical re-
sult in the GA model. Slightly less-extreme Justices need not 
move so far, since they can attract joins from the extremists. 
More centrally located Justices can write at or near their ideal 
point since they can receive joins from nearby neighbors. Thus, 
the model predicts a substantial direct effect and—rather dis-
tinctively—non-uniform peer effects. Again, opinion assign-
ment is quite important since different opinion authors craft 
distinctly different opinions. 
F.  SUMMARY AND TESTING STRATEGY 
Part III gathers together the predictions of the five ap-
proaches, noting each one’s predictions about direct effects, 
peer effects, and other predictions. A careful examination of the 
predictions suggests the following testing strategy as a way to 
parse the evidence so as to discriminate among the theories, at 
least as applied to the case study: 
First: Examine the direct effect of the Stewart-O’Connor 
switch overall and in the unanimous disposition. A zero direct 
effect points strongly in favor of the Median Voter and Majority 
Median approach. A non-zero effect points toward the three 
“author influence” models. 
Second: Examine the peer effects, contingent on the finding 
about the direct effect. Given a non-zero direct effect, zero peer 
effects point strongly to the Monopoly Author model. Non-zero 
but approximately uniform peer effects point to the Entry 
Blocking approach. Non-zero and non-uniform peer effects 
point to the Gravitational Attraction approach. 
Third: Seek corroboration from the other effects. In particu-
lar, using author-opinion diagrams, does the apparent location 
of the majority opinions tend to corroborate the conclusions 
from the first two steps?  
 1854 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1820 
 
IV.  CASE STUDY: O’CONNOR REPLACES STEWART   
A.  THE CHANGE 
In June 1981, Justice Potter Stewart announced his inten-
tion to retire from the High Court.109 Stewart had served on the 
Court since his appointment by Dwight Eisenhower in 1958.110 
During his tenure he established himself as a moderate or 
moderate conservative on the Court.111 On the last natural 
court on which he served, Burger 6 (1975−1981), Stewart was 
probably the median Justice, as shown in Figure 8.112 To Jus-
tice Stewart’s left were (moving from left to right), Thurgood 
Marshall, William Brennan, John Paul Stevens, and Harry 
Blackmun. To his right were (continuing from left to right) By-
ron White, Lewis Powell, Warren Burger, and William Rehn-
quist.113 
 
Figure 8. Relative Configurations of Preferences on Burger 6 and 
Burger 7. The Justices are arrayed by their constant Martin-Quinn “ideal 
points.” Justices who are shown as proximate tend to vote similarly on case 
dispositions; those far apart tend to vote differently on case dispositions. Those 
on the left are conventionally liberal; those on the right conventionally con-
servative. The median Justice in Burger 6 was probably Justice Stewart (but 




 109. See Steven R. Weisman, Stewart Will Quit High Court July 3; Reasons 
Not Given, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1981, at A1. 
 110. See Terrance Sandalow, Potter Stewart, 95 HARV. L. REV. 6, 6 (1981). 
 111. See id. at 8–9. 
 112. See also supra tbl.1. 
 113. See 453 U.S. III (1981); fig.8. 
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Newly elected President Ronald Reagan redeemed his cam-
paign pledge to nominate the first woman to the high court114 
by selecting Sandra Day O’Connor, a former Arizona state leg-
islator and law school classmate of Justice Rehnquist.115 Her 
arrival marked the beginning of the Burger 7 natural court, 
which lasted from 1981 to 1986. O’Connor’s voting on case dis-
positions suggested a solid though not extreme conservative. 
Thus, most of the Justices on Burger 7 were to her left, includ-
ing moderate conservative Lewis Powell; Justice Rehnquist was 
clearly to her right, while she and Chief Justice Burger ap-
peared similar in overall ideological orientation. 
 
Figure 9. The Distribution of Ideal Points Before and After the Ste-
wart-O’Connor Switch. Bar height shows the percentage of Justices in the 
indicated MQ intervals. Stewart’s departure and O’Connor’s arrival weakened 
the moderates and strengthened the conservatives, without altering the liber-
als’ strength. Ideal policies are proxied by MQ Scores, based on similarities in 
disposition voting. The line is the fit from a kernel density smoother; it sug-
gests a centrist Court transformed into a center-right Court. 
 
 
 114. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A 
HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO 
CLINTON 256 (1999). 
 115. See id. at 255. 






















 1856 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1820 
 
What impact did Stewart’s departure and O’Connor’s ar-
rival have on the distribution of preferences on the Court? In 
terms of the location of the median Justice, probably very little, 
if any.116 Because Stewart’s and White’s dispositional voting 
scores were so similar (.14 versus .18), the personnel change 
probably moved the median almost indiscernibly to the right. 
However, in terms of the Court’s entire distribution, the switch 
did have an impact, as shown in Figure 9. If we call Justices 
with MQ scores below -.33 “liberal,” those between -.33 and .33 
“moderate,” and those above .33 as “conservative,” the effect of 
the switch was to decrease the moderate faction from one-third 
of the Court to twenty-two percent (or two-ninths), and increase 
the conservative block from one-third to forty-four percent 
(four-ninths). Stewart’s departure and O’Connor’s arrival thus 
strengthened the conservative side of the Court without wea-
kening the left. A centrist Court became a center-right Court 
with a left wing, a step toward polarized left-right blocs.  
B.  THE DIRECT EFFECT: O’CONNOR’S OPINIONS VERSUS 
STEWART’S OPINIONS 
Figure 10 compares the empirical join function for majority 
opinions authored by Stewart with that of O’Connor’s majority 
opinions, based upon the sixty-two and sixty-five majority opi-
nions they penned in Burger 6 and Burger 7, respectively. In 
Burger 6, Justice Powell was more likely to join to Stewart’s 
majority opinions than any other Justice. This suggests that 
Stewart located his majority opinions near Justice Powell’s 
ideal point, about .40 on the MQ scale. This location was consi-
derably more conservative than Stewart’s own ideal point (.14), 
which was also the median ideal point. On the Burger 7 Court, 
Chief Justice Burger was more likely than any other Justice to 
join O’Connor’s majority opinions. This suggests she placed her 
opinions near Burger’s ideal point (.81), perhaps at her own 
ideal point (.78). Her opinions were quite far from the median 
(.18). In short, the empirical join functions suggest that 
O’Connor’s opinions were considerably more conservative than 
those of Stewart and neither set of opinions were near the ideal 
point of the median Justice. These results flatly contradict the 
predictions of the Median Voter approach.117 
 
 116. See supra fig.8.  
 117. See infra tbl.3. 
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Figure 10. Empirical Join Functions for Stewart’s Opinions in Burger 
6 and O’Connor’s Opinions in Burger 7. Each point indicates the probabil-
ity a Justice with that ideal rule joined majority opinions authored by Stewart 
(open circles and solid line) or O’Connor (dark circles and dashed line). For ex-
ample, Justice Rehnquist (MQ score of 1.66) joined about seventy-two percent 
of Stewart’s opinions; he joined over eighty percent of O’Connor’s. The pat-
terns suggest Stewart located his opinions near Justice Powell’s ideal point, 
about .40. O’Connor seems to have authored more conservative opinions lo-
cated on average near Justice Burger’s ideal point, .81, perhaps at her own 
ideal point, .78. Neither is near the Court’s median (indicated with a vertical 
gray line). The figure thus suggests a direct effect of about .4 MQ points. 
 
What about Stewart and O’Connor’s majority opinion 
placements controlling for dispositional coalition, for example 
in the unanimous disposition? Figure 11 displays the relevant 
empirical join functions, based on the thirteen majority opi-
nions Stewart and O’Connor authored in the unanimous dispo-
sition configurations in Burger 6 and 7. The Majority Median 
approach predicts that the two Justices will locate their opi-
nions at the two Courts’ respective medians (.14 in Burger 6 
and .18 in Burger 7). Consequently, the MM approach also pre-
dicts little difference in the locations of the two opinions.  
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But this is not the pattern on display in Figure 11. Instead, 
the data suggest that neither Justice located opinions near the 
medians. Nor did the two sets of opinions share the same loca-
tion. Instead, O’Connor’s empirical join function peaked be-
tween Powell’s and Burger’s ideal points (.40 and .81, respec-
tively) while Stewart’s peaked at Stevens’s ideal point (-.44). 
O’Connor’s unanimous disposition opinions seem to have been 
much more conservative than Stewart’s. Absent serious mea-
surement error, these results are difficult to reconcile with the 
MM approach.  
 
Figure 11. Empirical Join Functions for Majority Opinions in the Un-
animous Disposition Coalition Authored by Stewart in Burger 6 and 
O’Connor in Burger 7. Stewart’s empirical join function (open circles, solid 
line) peaked at Stevens’s ideal point (-.44) while O’Connor’s empirical join 
function (dark circles, dashed line) peaked between Powell and Burger’s ideal 
points (.40 and .81). Again, neither set of opinions seems located near the me-
dian, and O’Connor’s opinions appear more conservative than Stewart’s.  
 
In sum, O’Connor’s presence on the Court directly in-
creased the volume of conservative opinions. While this seems 
like common sense, it is not what the most prevalent theory of 
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the Court—the Median Voter approach—predicts. The data al-
so provide little support for the recent variant on the Median 
Voter approach, the Majority Median approach. Instead, the di-
rect effect points to author influence, as suggested by the other 
three approaches.  
C.  PEER EFFECTS: EFFECTS ON THE CONTINUING JUSTICES’ 
OPINIONS 
The following four panels represent the MQ scores of the 
eight Justices who participated on both Burger 6 and Burger 7. 
More liberal Justices are grouped together as are moderate and 
conservative Justices. Each Justice’s probability of joining a 
colleague’s opinion is shown with an open circle. Each panel al-
so shows the location of the median Justice and the average lo-
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Figure 12. Empirical Join Functions for the Continuing Justices on 
Burgers 6 and 7. Open circles show the probability a Justice at the indicated 
MQ Score joined the indicated author’s majority opinions (joins from the opi-
nion author excluded). The vertical line indicates the position of the Court’s 
median Justice. The peak of each join function presumably corresponds to the 
average location of that Justice’s opinions. 
 
The four panels in figure 12 display empirical join func-
tions for the opinions authored by the eight Justices who served 
on both Burgers 6 and 7. Strikingly, the join functions for Jus-
tices on the left tend to slope downward; those for Justices in 
the middle are relatively flat; and those for Justices on the 
right slope upwards. These patterns suggest that Justices tend 
to write opinions located near their own part of the ideological 
space, confirming the finding in the previous section.118 Also 
striking, however, is the change in the peaks and shapes of the 
empirical join functions for many of the Justices. Seemingly, 
majority opinion locations shifted between Burger 6 and Burger 
7 for Justices Marshall, Stevens, Blackmun, White, and Burg-
er. In other words, at least for these Justices, there appear to 
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be non-zero peer effects. Non-zero peer effects are difficult to 
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Table 3. Predictions about Direct Effects, Peer Effects, and Other Lo-
cation Effects in Burger 6 and Burger 7. Changes in opinion assignment 
can be consequential in the MA, EB and the GA approaches and can affect es-
timates of direct and peer effects. The frequency of disposition coalitions can 
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Figure 13. Peer Effects in the Unanimous Disposition. Shown are the 
empirical join functions to opinions by the eight continuing Justices in Burger 
6 and Burger 7, grouped into three ideological categories. Joins to own opi-
nions are excluded. The empirical join functions suggest the moderates 
(Blackmun and White) may have written slightly more conservative opinions 
in Burger 7 than in Burger 6. The conservatives (Powell, Burger, and Rehn-
quist) may have shifted their opinions slightly to the right as well. The liberals 
(Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens) may or may not have shifted their opinions.  
 
If the Majority Median approach is correct, what appear to 
be non-zero peer effects in Figure 12 may result from mixing 
the opinions written by the same author in different disposition 
coalitions, since the medians in those coalitions would be dif-
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empirical join functions of the continuing Justices restricted to 
a single disposition coalition—the unanimous disposition. To 
increase sample size, we pool the majority opinions from the 
continuing liberals, moderates, and conservatives.119 Although 
the empirical join functions for each cluster of Justices are 
broadly similar across the two courts, there are some notable 
changes. In particular, the shift upward in the right side of the 
join function for conservative authors suggests that conserva-
tive majority opinions shifted to the right (in other words, con-
servatives were more inclined to join opinions written by other 
conservatives, even excluding O’Connor’s opinions). The greater 
willingness of conservatives to join majority opinions penned by 
moderates hints at a rightward shift in at least some of their 
opinions as well. Although this evidence cannot be definitive, 
the apparent presence of peer effects in the unanimous disposi-
tion raises doubts about the applicability of the Majority Me-
dian approach. 
Of the peer effects on display in Figure 12, some indicate 
leftward shifts of opinions (for Justices Marshall and Black-
mun) while others indicate rightward shifts (for Stevens, 
White, and Burger). Among the contemporary approaches to 
Supreme Court decision making, non-uniform shifts point to 
the GA approach.120 However, proponents of the Entry Blocking 
model might suggest that these effects represent the impact of 
unmeasured variables on the varying Justices’ opinion loca-
tions,121 a possibility difficult to reject. 
In sum, the peer effects seem to reject the Median Voter 
and Monopoly Author approaches. The peer effects in the un-
animous disposition seem somewhat at odds with the Majority 
Median approach. The peer effects appear reasonably compati-
ble with the GA model, but one cannot conclusively rule out 
Entry Blocking behavior.  
 
 119. We score liberals as those with MQ scores less than -.33 (Marshall, 
Brennan, and Stevens); moderates as those with MQ scores between -.33 and 
.33 (Blackmun and White); and conservatives as those with scores greater 
than .33 (Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist).  
 120. See Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 60, at 30. 
 121. See generally Lax & Cameron, supra note 46 (hypothesizing that sub-
tle variables such as policy content, writing costs, legal quality, and agenda-
setting are crucial considerations in the bargaining and opinion assignment 
process). 
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D.  AUTHOR-OPINION DIAGRAMS 
Author-opinion diagrams combine the direct effects and 
peer effects with other location information and allow a 
straightforward comparison between the observed patterns and 
those predicted by the theories.  
Figure 14 presents empirical author-opinion diagrams for 
the two natural courts, showing our best estimates of the aver-
age majority opinion locations for each Justice. The first pair of 
panels score each Justice’s average opinion location as the loca-
tion with the maximum probability of joins, as revealed in Fig-
ure 12.122 The second pair of panels employs the three locations 
corresponding to the three highest points in each Justice’s em-
pirical join function, if those points were within ten percent of 
the maximum.123 Then, a highly flexible nonparametric regres-
sion is fit to those locations to show the shape of the data.124  
 
 
 122. We score Justice Blackmun’s locations according to the discussion in 
Part II. 
 123. For example, in the upper right-hand panel, three points are shown 
for Marshall’s opinions. These correspond to the three highest points on his 
empirical join function, as the second and third highest points gained almost 
as many joins as the highest one. If no other locations gained as many joins as 
the maximum-gaining location, the maximum is triply weighed, to assure 
equal observations for each Justice.  
 124. This is a “loess” regression with spans of one-half and two-thirds for 
Burger 6 and Burger 7, respectively. These spans somewhat smooth the data 
but allow their local shapes to remain. For an explanation of nonparametric 
regression, loess regression, and weighted regression, see DAVID HAND ET AL., 
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Figure 14. Empirical Author-Opinion Diagrams for Burger 6 and 
Burger 7. In the top panels, the estimated average opinion location corres-
ponds to the maximum of the associated empirical join function shown in Fig-
ure 12. In the bottom panels, the three locations with the highest join rate to 
the author’s opinions are shown, along with the fit from a locally weighted re-
gression. 45-degree and median lines are shown for reference. 
 
In our view, five features stand out in the figures. First, 
the curves in the figures are clearly not horizontal lines lying at 
the median Justice’s ideology. Second, the curves slope upward. 
Third, some of the opinions seem to fall outside the critical re-
gion. Fourth, the most extreme Justices appear to locate their 
opinions somewhat centrally, given their ideal points. Finally, 
the right-hand side of the curve in Burger 7 appears to be a flat 
line, or nearly flat line, located at about O’Connor’s location.  
If, tentatively, one takes these patterns at their face value, 
they have strong implications for the theories. First, it is hard 
to see how these data could have been generated by Justices 
who behave as the Median Voter approach suggests. Instead, 
the rising curves strongly suggest a degree of author influence. 
But, the opinion locations are not tightly fixed on the 45-degree 
line. Although measurement error may be the culprit, the de-
partures from the 45-degree line suggest more is going on than 
the Monopoly Author approach allows. Most of the opinions lie 
in the critical region, but some do not. Again, measurement er-
ror may account for these seemingly errant observations, but 
they raise questions about the Entry Blocking approach. The 
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what centrally is consistent with join-seeking behavior indica-
tive of the Gravitational Attraction approach.  
The peer effects among the Court’s conservatives present a 
puzzle. Why does O’Connor’s presence seem to stabilize the 
opinions of conservative Justices around her ideal point? Per-
haps the apparent pattern is simply a coincidence. But it ap-
pears as if the O’Connor-Burger-Powell locus created a power-
ful center of gravity that attracted the opinions of right-side 
authors as they sought joins. In effect, O’Connor’s presence al-
lowed conservatives to author more assertive opinions without 
sacrificing joins. In contrast, Stewart’s departure made chasing 
joins in the center somewhat less attractive.  
E.  SUMMING UP 
We should be cautious in drawing overly strong conclusions 
from a single case study. Nonetheless, let us be bold in inter-
preting the results if only to stimulate thought and, perhaps, 
refutation. 
First, the data are quite harsh to the Median Voter ap-
proach. The data are sufficiently unfavorable as to make one 
skeptical about the utility of viewing Supreme Court nomi-
nations as a move-the-median game. The data from the un-
animous disposition coalition also appear relatively unfavora-
ble to the Majority Median approach. Still, this perspective may 
well offer a convenient approximation of average Supreme 
Court outcomes disposition by disposition. But thinking about 
Supreme Court nominations as a move-the-median-in-
important-dispositions game seems unlikely to be terribly help-
ful.  
The data appear much more favorable to the author-
influence approaches. If the findings from the case study hold 
up, one should expect sizeable direct policy effects from a new 
Justice. However, the presence of notable peer effects is hard to 
reconcile with the Monopoly Author approach and suggests 
that the impact of a nominee can extend much farther than 
that particular theory would allow. The data we have examined 
do not allow a clean adjudication between the Entry Blocking 
and Gravitational Attraction approaches—or a rejection of both 
in favor of some yet-to-be-developed approach. However, the 
non-zero and varying peer effects that apparently occurred of-
fer some support for the Gravitational Attraction model.  
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V.  PRESIDENTIAL STRATEGY AND  
PRESIDENTIAL POWER   
If our assessment of the evidence is correct and something 
like the Gravitational Attraction model is at work in the Jus-
tices’ decision making, what are the implications for the Presi-
dent’s ability to shape legal doctrine through Supreme Court 
appointments? 
The first implication is critical: every nomination matters. 
Even nominations that do not move the median can weaken 
one gravitational center and strengthen another. Doing so can 
shift opinions. Presidents who care about judicial policy cannot 
afford to “let one go”; they need to exercise discipline and main-
tain their focus in every nomination. 
Second, much of the impact of a new Justice may lie not in 
her own opinions but in the influence she exerts on the opinions 
of others. For example O’Connor’s availability for joins seems to 
have emboldened opinion authors on the right and acted as a 
magnet for those in the center. Thus, opportunities to shift cen-
ters of gravity can have a large payoff, much greater than simp-
ly placing a new source of congenial opinions on the Court. 
Third, presidents should strive to strengthen ideological 
centers on the Court at the President’s own ideology. Putting a 
Justice in the wrong location—too liberal or too conservative—
will just pull opinions to the wrong place. Over a series of ap-
pointments, presidents should aim at building or strengthening 
a gravitational center that is neither too extreme nor too mod-
erate, from their own perspective. 
The author-influence approaches have another very clear 
implication: opinion assignment matters. Even within the same 
disposition coalition, assignment to a Justice on one end of the 
coalition can result in policy content very different from that 
following assignment to a Justice on the opposite end of the 
disposition coalition. The Chief Justice, of course, plays a vital 
role in the assignment process.125  
Fourth, the Chief Justice position is a valuable prize. The 
Chief ’s ability to steer opinions to “friends” may make a big dif-
ference in doctrinal content, especially in important cases.  
Fifth, appointments that strengthen the hand of the Chief 
or are compatible with his ideology are likely to carry an extra 
punch. If the Chief has more nearby targets for receiving as-
signments in important cases, he can use them to alter doc-
 
 125. See Lax & Cameron, supra note 46, at 292. 
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trine. Conversely, appointments that weaken the hand of the 
Chief may also be important. Thinning the density of Justices 
near a hostile Chief may force him to assign even important 
cases farther away than he would wish, again with conse-
quences for doctrine.  
 
Figure 15. Ideological Distribution of the Contemporary Supreme 
Court Relative to Burger 7. The contemporary Court has two centers of 
gravity: a moderate center around Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, and a con-
servative center around Justices Alito and Roberts. A new appointment can 
either strengthen an existing center or begin to build a new center of gravity 
elsewhere. 
 
Simply to make matters more concrete, consider the con-
temporary Supreme Court, Roberts 2, whose ideological distri-
bution is shown in Figure 15. As indicated, the contemporary 
Court has two centers of gravity: a moderate center located 
around Justices Ginsburg and Breyer and a conservative center 
located around Justices Alito and Roberts. Facing such a Court, 
what appointment strategies might Republican and Democratic 
presidents wish to pursue?126  
Republican presidents have an obvious and straightfor-
ward strategy: further strengthen the Roberts-Alito-Scalia clus-
ter. Doing so would bolster the attractive power of the cluster; 
it would also supply the Chief with additional targets for im-
portant assignments. 
Democratic presidents face more difficult decisions. One in-
teresting possibility, however, is re-establishing a liberal center 
 
 126. We write following the election of Democratic President Barack Ob-
ama but before he has had an opportunity to nominate any Justices.  
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of gravity, say, at the Brennan location. The evidence from the 
Burger 6 and 7 natural courts suggests the direct effect from a 
single liberal appointment would be quite modest, because such 
a Justice would be compelled to seek joins from moderates. 
Thus, she would need to locate her opinions rather centrally, as 
did Marshall in Burger 6. But the presence of a Brennan-style 
Justice might exert a peer effect on the moderates, consolidat-
ing their opinions more solidly at the moderate position and 
partially off-setting the pull of the right. Of course, strategic 
assignments by the Chief would tend to limit the impact of a 
single liberal appointment. But several such appointments 
would have greater impact, not only by establishing a more po-
werful basin of attraction on the left, but by restricting the 
nearer assignment targets for the Chief.  
In some sense, the lessons that emerge from theory and da-
ta have already been absorbed. Presidents select nominees 
carefully, work hard to manage the entire process, and strive 
diligently to build favorable centers of gravity on the Court. 
Our analysis suggests why these efforts make sense and why 
and how they can succeed.  
